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Real, intimate, reciprocal love is difficult to understand and describe. The translators of the 
Contemporary English Version (CEV) of the Bible had a problem with translating the 
concept of love found in John 15:9. David Dewey notes that the last part of this text "So 
remain faithful to my love for you" was the translators' most difficult phrase to translate 
in the entire Bible. For the CEV translators, the problem was making dear in a current 
language what the passage meant when it was written thousands of years ago. What did 
Jesus mean when his farewell words to the disciples included the counsel, "remain faithful 
to my love"? 
Meaning, Dewey points out, is only one of many questions in the translation process. 
The book's first section covers a range of concerns that translators address: the unique style 
of individual Bible books, the readtng level of their target audience, and how translation 
sounds when read out loud. Dewey helps the reader to understand scholars' efforts to 
translate Scripture into prose that is easy to remember, their struggles with appropriate 
rendering of the divine name and with issues of gender and theological bias. He gives 
insight into the difficulties involved in preserving the unity of the whole Bible as translators 
concentrate on individual passages or genres, books, sections, or testaments, and the 
idiosyncracies of the original Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. The reader begins to sense the 
relative newness and extreme challenge of this most complex process when it is considered 
that the Bible as a single book was not usually available until the fifteenth century, and that, 
apart from paraphrases, Bible translation is consistently a committee effort. 
If Part 1 of this book is technical, Part 2 is a story. Dewey traces the epic of how the 
English Bible came to the twenty-&st century from early Anglo-Saxon songs on the lips 
of the Yorkshire laborer Caedmon, as far back, perhaps, as the seventh century A.D. He 
presents Wycliffe, the Reformation's "morning star," and the Bible that bears his name 
(although we do not know how much of it is his own work). He also recounts Tyndale's 
famous outburst against the blasphemy of a certain divine, "We were better to be without 
God's laws than the Pope's" (Foxe's Book ofMattyrs), to which Tyndale responded: "I defy 
the Pope and all his laws. If God spare my life, before many years I will make sure that a 
boy who drives the plough knows more of the Scriptures than you do" (120). 
For all its careful research and impressive wealth of information, A U.w-3 G z d  to 
Bib& Translbtonsremains thoroughly accessible throughout. Dewey's gift for comprehensive 
and comprehensible detail shows that he can solve mysteries, as well as generate them-a 
practice he follows consistently from his introduction. He teases: "[Dlon't turn to that final 
chapter just yet; you will spoil the plot" (25). I offer no encouragement to spoil the plot 
either. Rather, I urge the reader to secure a copy of this book, whether you are a college 
student, experienced layperson, theological scholar, or aficionado of English literature. 
Dewey's presentation of the latest trends in translation and his informative and valuable 
appendices provide discussion about issues of translation, such as textual criticism, disputed 
Bible passages (e.g., the endings of the Lord's Prayer and Mark's Gospel), as well as Bible 
websites and handheld and desktop software. A User? Guide to Bibh Transkztions is reading 
for total profit. 
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If religious groups are treated as entirely benign by lawmakers it will be at society's peril. 
Citizens of the United States tend to see religion as an "unalloyed good," as if it were 
consistently altruistic and philanthropic. Godvs. the Gadposits that "the unrealistic belief 
that rehgion is always for the good, however, is a hazardous myth" (3). It is true that 
humanity has profited in countless ways by religious institutions; however, the focus of 
this work is the negative side of religion concomitant with faulty legislation. The author 
admits that her purpose "is to bring to light the remarkable power of religious entities 
to obtain special treatment in the legislatures" (237). 
Marci A. Hamilton begins with a critique of Stephen Carter's (Cukure ofDkbe6e~j 
characterization of a secular America with relqon as the underdog. Thinking that r e b o n  
has lost its force in thts culture has opened the door for relIgIon7s role as not only the 
downtrodden institution but also as a clandestine political power. (Reverend Jerry Falwell 
has recently opened a law school to educate "Christian lawyers.") In fact, relIgIous groups 
are as sawy and politically entrenched as any K-street lobbyist. Since the late fifties, while 
minority groups have been fighting for equality, relggous entities have been "starting from 
equality under the law and then asking for privileges beyond equal treatment" (229). 
Relqpous organizations live in the world not above it. Even preachers of the eighteenth 
century exhorted their parishioners that as they had chosen their leaders they must also 
obey them. The author maintains that the American myth of relqgon as indubitable causes 
some to think rehgious behavior should be beyond the law. 
Hamilton avers that rehgion as a whole should be looked upon with a healthy dose 
of incredulity and supports her thesis with myriads of examples (endnotes constitute twenty 
percent of the book). Six areas in Part l-children, marriage, r ebous  land use, schools, 
prisons and the military, and housing and employment discrimination-elucidate why in 
the American socd contract law must trump relqon and lawmakers must be chary. 
Rehgiously motivated crimes are not limited to stereotypical outcast groups. Established, 
legitimate institutions, such as the Catholic Church, as well as the modem and bizarre, are 
exhibited. 
If "separation of church and state" clarifies the government's role toward the 
ecdesia, why should it be looked upon with suspicion or even regarded whatsoever? The 
unsavory conduct of certain parishioners and the cover-ups by relqpous superiors means 
that lawmakers owe it to their constituents to scrupulously legislate on relqgous matters. 
Silence and semblance have been resorted to in order to defend a rehgious institution's 
public image as a close-knit model community. Such a Pollyanna image, as with an 
innocuous clergy, kept the press from reporting many crimes for decades. Blindly trusting 
any group is renouncing one's social responsibility. Such cynicism "is not antirebous . . . 
it keeps the system honest, the result just, and the First Amendment legitimate" (165). 
Some, revealing a chimerical optimism, may argue that legislation can not be based on a few 
bad apples. One writer in particular has brazenly written that "the exercise of relqgon 
should trump most governmental regulation." Hamilton espoused this understanding in 
1993, but since then she has been whghtened to the fallacy of Carter's argument that 
relqgon is weak in government and forgotten by lawmakers. She rebuts her previous 
position by stating that "even if these are bad apples, these bad apples are precisely whom 
the law is intended to deter and punish" (47). 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said: "FJhe life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience" (Common Latv, 1881,l). Part 2 gives a historical perspective in order to 
elucidate how the relationship between legislation and religion has evolved into the present 
confusion. In Britain, at least back to the twelfth century, the church and crown were on 
an equal footing. The clergy were beyond the reach of the law (priM'h@utll chicah) and, ifever 
found guilty, received lesser punishments than ordinary citizens. This ecclesiastical court 
system of the medleval world was removed by the seventeenth century. If "executive 
privilege" for clergy were given today, it would be a throwback to a darker time when the 
church dominated society. The pioneering colonists, children of Queen Elizabeth I, whose 
reign abolished these courts from criminal jurisdiction, brought with them the knowledge 
of the consequences arising from an ecclesiastical state. The Founders-relying on the 
experiences of European history-rejected a society under the crown or the church. 
Church autonomy, in their opinion, was a will to power, not an inherent right. They 
believed that humans, even rehgious ones, will often abuse the power they have and thus 
developed checks and balances, such as, in this case, the law. 
Recently, however, this check has become derelict Church hierarchy, responding to 
child abuse accusations, has broached the First Amendment as a restraint on the courts 
from intervening in interchurch squabbles. Forty years ago, the Supreme Court began to 
pander to reltgious groups by "treating every law that substantially burdened relqgous 
conduct as presumptively unconstitutional" (206). The Constitution may not have obviated 
the specifics of present-day abuses, but it did set up a framework to apply the law. Does the 
Second Amendment give license for any criminal to own any gun they wish? Does "a 
speedy trial" mean "immediately"? Yet, the First Amendment is interpreted unconQtionally 
in the vaguest of cases. The results of such a docttine are that relqgous institutions are "free 
to engage in immoral or antisoclal behavior" (196). 
'The First Amendment is about freedom from government overreaching, not about 
finding loopholes for criminals to avoid paying what they owe society" (47). Once 
government intrudes upon belief, then and only then is it overreaching. In Reynokh vs. 
United States (1 878), the defendant asked the Supreme Court to apply reltgious freedom to 
behavior, as well as belief. Thomas Jefferson precluded this argument, and the Court 
upheld it, by stating that "the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and 
not opinion" (207). In another place, he said that "it does me no injury for my neighbour 
to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." 
Liberty of belief is absolute; however, once conduct stemming from a conviction begins to 
harm society then the government has the responsibility to execute the law without 
exception. Relqgon, like all entities, must be subject to the law-"unless they can prove that 
exempting them will cause no harm to others" (5). The public good is the d e h g  factor. 
If one is guided by the public good as a bedrock of legislation then why does Bob 
Jones University's sanctioning of an interracial dating prohibition (the I.R.S. threatened to 
revoke its tax-exempt status for this regulation) fail to meet the criteria, but churches 
rejecting women as clergy, noticeably absent from the book, does not enervate society? 
Hamilton splendidly built the case for the principle, but arbitrarily applied it in the 
examples. So it must be, for arbitrariness will be perpetual as long as legislators in a republic 
are given the latitude to vote the way they interpret the public good. 
This debate over public policy belongs, Hamilton vigorously argues, in the legislative 
branch of government rather than the judicial or the executive. A judge is hemmed in by 
the facts of a case and the executive lacks the constant and varied contact with the hoipohi. 
The legislative, on the other hand, can call hearings, appoint expert commissions, order 
extensive studies, and look at the larger picture of society. If a relqgous accommodation is 
to be made, it is to be enacted solely by a legislature. All too often, though, religious 
exceptions are the creation of surreptitious lobbying groups with uncanny political dexterity 
rather than "the result of legislative consideration in hght of the public good" (196). With 
these distinctions made, the reader must ask whether the abuses of the law are due to 
relqgous groups working the system, lawmakers who are not scrupulous enough to probe 
the consequences of legislation, or the courts for meddling in public policy without the 
pertinent tools? 
Hamilton's personal legal work in relqgous land use causes her to exaggerate this 
field of litigation. The examples appear trivial adjacent with chapters on child abuse and 
discrimination. Although the cases referenced are not as numerous as other chapters, 
relqgous land abuse is adumbrated and made as important as it can be in hght of the public 
good. The Relqgous Freedom Restoration A a  of 1993 gave enormous latitude to relqous 
landowners until 1997 when the Supreme Court held that federal legislation could not 
supersede state authority in this realm. Reltgious groups were not daunted and convinced 
Congress to pass the Reltgious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in 2000. 
Hamilton believes this is the epitome of special-interest legislation and it has "turned 
neighbor against neighbor" (97). For example, the emergence of mega churches has, at 
times, brought disruption and an image transformation to halcyon residential 
neighborhoods. The author depicts houses of worship intentionally bringing in 
tatterdemalions to pollute once-pristine neighborhoods. In one case, malcontent residents 
complained about increased noise and the grievance was labeled as a pretext for 
antirehgous sentiment. The view of this specific court was that whatever the rebous  
institution desired to do would be beneficial for all. Whose view of the public good should 
be followed-the courts or Hamilton? 
It is difficult to divine the author's view of relqgon. Is she worried that America is 
kowtowing to powerful and devious rebous  groups? Is she applauding society for being 
more agnostic than the pious would have? At t lnes -as  when disputing Carter's 
thesis-she states that r e b o n  is a powerful force in the country, yet when finding fault 
with the nation's rejection of gay marriage, which she apparently supports under law, the 
United States is unequivocally not "Christian." Is it possible America is both? 
There is an apparent agenda against relqqous convictions under the guise of the 
public good. After opining that r ebous  organizations ought to be curbed from using their 
property to suit their desires when it interferes with a neighborhood's image, Hamilton 
continues to asseverate that landlords contravene fair-housing laws by rejecting unmamed 
couples or other tenants that run conttary to their own beliefs. The author even indiscreetly 
finds fault-because of public good-with the relqpously motivated act of home schooling. 
It has always been tenebrous alqpng individual liberties with the larger society. Hamilton's 
emphasis upon m repubha ("public good") makes her appear to be a pre-Revolutionary 
Whig, who would have neglected individual liberties for the whole. However, it depends 
upon the issue at hand. In rehgious land use cases the individual must accede to the many, 
but with gay marriage, she implies that the multitude must comply with the wishes of the 
individual. It is a difficult issue that remains opaque after reading this work. 
The issues raised in this work affect all. Whether one believes they belong to God 
or to the state, it is vital that humans belongs to each other. There is a unitary harmony that 
must be maintained in a commonwealth. God vs. the Gad leaves the impression that 
freedom is not so much passively demanding one's own rights, but rather actively being a 
keeper of each other's. 
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Murray J. Harris is Professor Emeritus of New Testament Exegesis and Theology at Trinity 
Evangelical School, Deerfield, Illinois. He has published a number of scholarly articles and 
his published books include Rahed Imm-ortak h~urndion and Immorta4p in the New Testament 
(Eerdmans, 1983); From Grave to Ghy: fisurndion in the New Testament: IncIudng a ReJpOme 
to Noman L G&hr (Zondervan, 1990); Cohsians and Pbihmon (Exegetica/ Guide to the Greek 
New Testmen) (Fkrdmans, 1990); Jesus as God The New Testment Use ofTheos in Reference to 
Jew (Baker, 19%); Three CfuaalQuestions aboutJesus (Baker, 1994); and She 0fChrist:A New 
Testament Metaphorfor Devotion to Ch&, New Studies in Biblical Theology 8 (InterVarsity, 
2001). He also coedited Pauhne Studes: E s s y ~  Pmented to F. F. Bruce (Eerdmans, 1980). 
It has been said that if Solomon would write Ecd 12:12 today, he might well say: 
"Of the making of many Bible Commentaries there is no end." That is why Harris is aware 
that "it has become incumbent on authors to indicate in what ways they believe their 
commentaries make a distinctive contribution to New Testament studies" (xiii). Harris 
offers three reasons for the uniqueness of his commentary: he is "now inclined to defend 
the integrity of the canonical 2 Corinthians with even more confidence" (xiii) and has seen 
many other commentators recently come to similar conclusions; one of the aims of the 
New International Greek Testament Commentary series is to "cater particularly to the 
needs of students of the Greek text" (xi) because "Scripture cannot be understood 
theologically unless it has first been understood grammatically" (xiv); and the commentary 
offers a "Chronology of the Relations of Paul, Timothy, and Titus with the Corinthian 
Church" (xv). 
In the introduction, Harris discusses literary issues, such as authorship, the "severe 
letter" and the integrity and purpose of the letter. There is agreement among scholars about 
Pauline authorship of 2 Corinthians since it belongs to the HaqbtbriGfCn, as F. C .  Baur called 
them. However, no letter is more closely tied to the vagaries of historical circumstance than 
2 Corinthians, not so much in regard to the historicity, but to the identity of the "severe 
lettery' or Trunenbrief: Harris offers, to those who reject the identification of the "sorrowful 
letter" as 1 Corinthians or 2 Corinthians 10-13, the option of a letter that is no longer 
